Revenue sharing can also take place within a single organization. Profits and operating losses may be distributed to stakeholders and general partners or limited partners. As with revenue-sharing models involving more than one company, the inner workings of these plans typically require contractual agreements between all parties involved. Revenue sharing takes many different forms, although each iteration involves the sharing of profits or operating losses between the associated financial actors. Sometimes revenue sharing is used as an incentive program – a small business owner may pay partners or employees, for example, a percentage reward for referring new customers. In other cases, the revenue share is used to distribute the profits resulting from a business alliance. The research results in this article are of important importance to the LSI. First of all, whether it`s “one-to-one” or “one-to” when working in reality, the customer-specific level in a rational area can be limited by consulting the customer. This will maximize fairness between LSI and FLSP and maintain the contractual relationship between revenue sharing.
Second, in the case of “one-to-” benefits between the LSI and each PRSP cannot be absolutely fair; Therefore, it is not necessary for the LSI to achieve absolute fairness with all FLSPs. Third, the LSI can try to choose the FLSP with greater flexibility as the adjusted level changes. For example, if the customer needs time to be adjusted, the LSI can choose the FLSP, which is preferably flexible in terms of time. It will not only meet customer needs, but is also good for achieving a larger overall supply chain tropie between LSI and FLSP and for fulfilling the long-term coordination contract. Fourth, ensure the fairness of all LSSC members, as the price increase obviously benefits the integrator, the FLSP and the subcontractors who can participate in the pricing before the signing of the revenue sharing contract. First, there is a certain boundary condition between the weighting and the partition coefficient of the LSI and the FLSP; Finally, the third limitation is that revenue sharing does not coordinate the supply chain if the retailer`s effort affects demand and that effort cannot be contractually agreed (para. B example, advertising, quality of service and presentation of the company). According to Cachon and Lariviere, if demand is sufficiently influenced by the retail effort, revenue-sharing agreements should be avoided. They argue that a volume discount would allow the supply chain to coordinate with effort-based demand and allocate rents without the use of fixed fees.
For volume discount contracts, the cost to the retailer is based on the volume purchased, with the price decreasing as more units are purchased. With a volume discount contract, the supplier makes the same profit regardless of demand, while the supplier bears a certain risk of demand in the case of revenue sharing. By changing the value of the adjusted level, it is possible to find the trend of variation of the corresponding income sharing coefficient and the overall fair entropy. (1) Establishment of the objective function. Once the condition for the implementation of the revenue sharing contract is met, an optimal revenue sharing coefficient should be confirmed in order to achieve a fair distribution of benefits between the LSI and the FLSP, thus maintaining the relationship between them and the revenue sharing. The basic idea for determining the objective function of the optimal supply chain revenue sharing coefficient is that profit growth is equal to the unit weight resource of each member of the supply chain [3, 42]. If the LSI revenue share coefficient is, the growth of the LSI and FLSP`s respective earnings is assumption 5. From the point of view of , it is assumed that the income distribution coefficients between the LSI and each PSL in FLSP are mutually visible. In practice, members of the supply chain always contain more than LSP and FLSP; FlSP should outsource its logistics capacity to the upstream logistics subcontractor, so that there are three participants in LSSC.
The tripartite LSSC model is shown in Figure 3. The ratings for the Three-Echelon LSSC “One to One” model are given as follows. (1) Establishment of the objective function. In the case of multiple WSPs, in addition to the fairness of revenue sharing between the LSFI and each WSP, the fairness of the revenue allocation coefficient between multiple WSPs must also be considered. Thus, a new just entropy is defined, which consists of two parts, one is the just entropy between the LSI and the FLSP and the other is the just entropy between the FLSP and the other FLSP. Members of the supply chain must ensure fairness by comparing revenue sharing coefficients appropriately. If the coefficients are invisible, it will be difficult for a PSL to judge relatively fairly. In this article, the motivation for research comes from practice and theory. From a practical point of view, as a new method to attract customers, tailor-made mass service has attracted a lot of attention in recent years. Due to the ability to provide a scaling service to multiple clients and a personalized service to individuals, the custom mass service has two features: a scaling effect and a custom effect.
It has been applied in many industries such as insurance services , logistics services  and aviation services . In the MCLS environment, downstream LSIs and upstream FLSPs need to address the issue of coordination and distribution of profits to meet customer demand. Given the tailor-made level and fairness of profits, it is necessary to draft a reasonable revenue-sharing agreement to ensure the stability of a supply chain for logistics services. On the other hand, most existing revenue-sharing contract research focuses primarily on coordinating a common supply chain of products or services [3, 9-11], but special cases such as contract research to share supply chain revenues in the MCLS environment have not yet been reported. The most closely related research on this article is that of Liu et al. ; They looked at the method for determining the optimal supply chain revenue sharing coefficient for two- and three-tier logistics services, but the study did not include the MCLS. In fact, MCLS and shared services have two significant gaps; The first is that the right level will influence the design of supply chain contracts. There is an urgent need to introduce the appropriate level into the design of revenue-sharing contracts from a theoretical point of view. The second is that the MCLS is provided by an LSI via the integration of the FLSP`s service capacity; Therefore, WSPs must assess the fairness of the distribution of profits. Therefore, consideration should also be given to a way to introduce an equity factor into a revenue-sharing agreement. Income sharing model proposed by the Rangarajan Committee in 2012 The Rangarajan Committee, which reviewed the Production Sharing Contract (MFF) system in 2012, had recommended replacing the SGP with a progressive sliding scale based on production combined with a fixed price-sensitive scale […].